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Abstract—The threat that insiders pose to businesses, institu-
tions and governmental organisations continues to be of serious
concern. Recent industry surveys and academic literature provide
unequivocal evidence to support the signiﬁcance of this threat and
its prevalence. Despite this, however, there is still no unifying
framework to fully characterise insider attacks and to facilitate
an understanding of the problem, its many components and how
they all ﬁt together. In this paper, we focus on this challenge
and put forward a grounded framework for understanding and
reﬂecting on the threat that insiders pose. Speciﬁcally, we propose
a novel conceptualisation that is heavily grounded in insider-
threat case studies, existing literature and relevant psychological
theory. The framework identiﬁes several key elements within the
problem space, concentrating not only on noteworthy events and
indicators – technical and behavioural – of potential attacks, but
also on attackers (e.g., the motivation behind malicious threats
and the human factors related to unintentional ones), and on
the range of attacks being witnessed. The real value of our
framework is in its emphasis on bringing together and deﬁning
clearly the various aspects of insider threat, all based on real-
world cases and pertinent literature. This can therefore act as a
platform for general understanding of the threat, and also for
reﬂection, modelling past attacks and looking for useful patterns.
Index Terms—insider threat; threat framework; technical,
psychological indicators; attack chain; case studies
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional notions of cybersecurity place an emphasis on
protecting against attacks that arise from external threats.
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the greater
threat to an organisation’s security may well lie within, as
evidenced in many recent surveys (for example the 2012
Cybercrime survey [1] and the Risk of Insider Fraud study
[2]). To underline this point, a recent study by Clearswift
[3] reports that 58% of reported security incidents were as a
result of insider threat. This point is further supported by a
number of recent high-proﬁle, highly publicised cases of data
exﬁltration and whistleblowing; for example Edward Snowden
[4], Xiang Dong Yu [5] and Michael Woodford [6]. Of course,
these reports probably only present a small percentage of the
cases of insider-threat. It is widely accepted that there are a
myriad of insider incidents that will go unreported (for fear
of damage to the reputation of the company, for instance) or
that will go unnoticed as the attacks simply avoid detection.
An insider can be thought of as an individual who is an
employee (past or present), contractor or other trusted third
party, who has privileged access to the networks, systems or
data of an organisation [7]. In this paper we will consider two
categories of insider threat. The ﬁrst is a malicious insider
threat, where the insider uses their privileged access to inten-
tionally cause a negative impact to the conﬁdentiality, integrity
or availability of the organisations’ information, systems or
infrastructure [7]. It is typically understood that a malicious
insider will seek to exploit their privileged access for some
inappropriate gain, whether it be personal, ﬁnancial or for
revenge. The attempted attack by a Fannie Mae employee after
being dismissed is a perfect example of an insider threat likely
motivated by revenge [8].
The second form of threat is that of an accidental, or non-
malicious, insider; this is actually reckoned to be the most
common type of threat [9, 10]. Carnegie Mellon University’s
Computer Emergency Response Team (CMU-CERT) pioneers
one of the most comprehensive research programs on insider
threat, and they deﬁne the accidental threat as an insider who,
without malicious intent and through action or inaction, causes
harm or increases the probability of future harm to the conﬁ-
dentiality, integrity or availability of the organisation’s assets
or resources (e.g., information or systems) [11]. This therefore
covers human mistakes, errors, and a barrage of other mishaps
that may compromise the organisation, many arguably the fault
of bad system design as much as negligence of insiders. For
the purpose of characterising attacks, such compromises are
included in the broad range of attacks that can potentially
occur. Real-world examples of the unintentional threat include
employees losing their work devices [12], accidentally leaking
sensitive company information on social networks [13], and
falling for phishing and other disguised malware attacks [14].
As the insider-threat problem has grown, so to has the
attention it has received within the research community. There
have been in-depth discourses on everything from what exactly
an insider threat is [15] and what the range of human and
psychological factors involved are [16, 17], to how threats
can be predicted, detected and effectively addressed with
appreciation of technological and behavioural advances and
theories [17–21]. These approaches have resulted in numerous
models and frameworks for insider threat, each with its distinct
perspective on the problem and speciﬁc area which it aims
to address. In spite of these advances in research and the
various proposals, however, there is arguably still no unifying
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framework which seeks to fully characterise the insider-threat
problem space. That is, deﬁning which insiders attack, why
they attack, the human factors that lead to accidental threats,
how one’s background may impact likelihood of attack, what
behaviour may be exhibited before or during an attack, what
the common attack vectors and steps within an attack are, and
what assets and vulnerabilities are typically targeted.
The focus of this paper is therefore to address this gap
and present a framework for understanding and characterising
insider threat that is grounded in real-world threat data and per-
tinent literature. We draw on insider-threat cases from CMU-
CERT and the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure (CPNI), broad survey data and existing research,
and apply a grounded-theory approach [22] to deduce the
framework. To evaluate its ability to capture and allow analysis
of a variety of attack scenarios, we use an additional set
of cases collected directly [23] within our broader research
project. Overall, the most closely related work to what we
propose is that by CMU-CERT (i.e., MERIT models for fraud,
IP sabotage, etc. [7]). The distinguishing factor of our work is
its broad nature and ability to capture all types of insider attack
in a single comprehensive framework, while also remaining
simple enough to facilitate understanding and discourse on
what is, at times, a very complex problem.
We expect the framework to be useful to security practition-
ers and researchers alike. It provides a basis for elucidating
the threat that practitioners’ enterprises face and the important
elements (e.g., precursors, indicators, attack types and steps)
that are worth taking note of within the insider-attack chain;
while for researchers, the framework supplies a well grounded
conceptualisation of the insider-threat domain that can form
the basis for understanding, and future research. A central
part of this utility is the framework’s capacity to retrospec-
tively analyse documented insider-threat cases, particularly for
purposes of identifying patterns of attack.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the scope of our work, methodology used to
deﬁne the framework and the context in which this research
should be viewed. Section III discusses the characterisation
of insider attacks, with a focus on the threat framework
developed, its components and the important relationships
identiﬁed. In Section IV, we demonstrate how our framework
can be used to capture and reﬂect upon several types of insider
attacks, be they malicious or accidental. Section V engages
in a critical discussion of the framework, ﬁrst comparing it
to related work, such as models by CMU-CERT, and then
reﬂecting on other related concerns and challenges. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VI, presenting avenues for
future work.
II. SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND CONTEXT
Our framework for characterising insider attacks was born
out of the need for a better approach by which the various
components of the insider-threat problem could be easily
understood and reﬂected upon. This objective served to guide
our research and scope the creation of the framework. To build
the framework itself, we adopted a grounded-theory approach.
Originating in the ﬁeld of sociology, grounded theory has
become a popular research method through which new frame-
works, models and theories can be developed, by a process of
data-gathering, categorisation and coding, followed by various
comparative and theoretical analyses of ﬁndings [22]. The
objective of grounded theory is to collect data for analysis
until saturation is reached in order to develop a new theory.
It is important to note that in grounded theory data-collection
and analysis are interrelated and analysis commences as soon
as data starts being collected. To apply the approach to our
work, we ﬁrst collected a data-set of 80 insider-threat cases.
There was no speciﬁc inclusion criteria, thereby allowing us to
use cases from CMU-CERT [7, 24], the UK’s CPNI [25] and
various news articles (e.g., [5,8,26–28]). To further enrich the
theory-development task, we also gathered as many relevant
publications – academic or industry-based – as we could ﬁnd
(for instance, [2, 11, 17, 29–36]), and thus followed the more
informed theory-generation approach [37] (considering data,
developing theory and then comparing with previous research).
Starting with the cases, we assessed each one and noted
emerging categories and themes (this was the categorisation
and coding process). An example of a theme that arose in
malicious-insider cases was ‘Motivation to Attack’, which de-
scribes the reason why an individual might have attacked their
organisation. As the themes were deﬁned, we also took the
opportunity to analyse relevant literature, both for additional
themes and to better interpret the ones that we were ﬁnding.
The next task was comparing and reﬂecting on the themes
identiﬁed across the cases, ﬁrst for consistency and then with
the aim of identifying relationships between themes. The latter
of these tasks was an iterative process that involved ﬁrst
hypothesising about each potential relationship, then validating
that hypothesis with the cases, and also against the literature;
we aimed for at least 70% agreement with the data to support
validation. One relationship identiﬁed, for instance, was the
strong inﬂuence that work and personal events (e.g., demotion
or ﬁnancial problems) had on an individual’s personality state;
a link further supported by psychological research [38].
Having identiﬁed a set of themes and relationships per-
taining to insider threat, we then constructed a diagrammatic
representation – this resulted in the ﬁrst draft of the full frame-
work. To allow evaluation and further analysis and reﬁnement,
we collected an additional set of 99 cases through direct
means [23], within our broader research project. These were
assessed and coded according to the procedure given above,
and the themes and relationships arising were compared to the
ones already identiﬁed in the framework. This proved to be a
very successful exercise, as a majority of the concepts found
were already present. One insight offered by the new cases,
however, was a greater range of the potential values associated
with the themes and framework components. For instance,
we found several previously unrecorded events which could
trigger an insider to attack (e.g., loyalty to friends or family,
and cultural pressures), and we were also able to further detail
the variety of psychological traits that may contribute to an
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Fig. 1. A framework for characterising insider attacks
insider attack, such as overly impulsive behaviour [23].
A ﬁnal point about our framework is that, as with all
proposals developed using grounded-theory, it is grounded in
the data that we assessed. Therefore, even though we sought
to be thorough in our investigation and framework develop-
ment, there may be aspects not yet represented, for instance,
inﬂuences on threat currently undiscovered. Additionally, it
is important that readers appreciate that our conceptualisation
aims at deﬁning and connecting the various main components
of insider threat, but also the various bodies of knowledge
(in Computer Science, Psychology, Organisational Behaviour)
that are imperative in fully appreciating and studying the
problem. This therefore seeks to deﬁne a central component of
the foundation for future understanding and work within this
space. At this stage, we are not aiming towards aspects such as
how the framework could be directly used to detect or predict
insider attacks. Moreover, the proposed framework does not
address practical details on: (i) how live data could be gathered
for framework components (e.g., Personality Characteristics
or Motivation to Attack) as part of protective monitoring
against attacks; (ii) how such data could meaningfully be
measured in an enterprise context to predict likely attacks; nor
(iii) what intensity of an element (e.g., desire for revenge) may
be needed to push an insider to the next stage (e.g., to launch
an attack). These are all very interesting and topical research
problems, but are not within the scope of this current report;
we do, however, for completeness, engage in some further
brief discussion on them in Section V-B.
III. CHARACTERISING INSIDER ATTACKS
The framework presented in Figure 1 consists of several
classes of component (or Element), depicted in four areas,
namely, attack Catalyst, Actor Characteristics (i.e., those of
a potential insider threat), Attack Characteristics and Or-
ganisation Characteristics. In the ﬁgure, boxes are used to
represent speciﬁc elements, while solid arrows indicate a
deﬁnite relationship between the elements and dashed lines
potential relationships. To assist in our discussion below, we
have further broken our consideration of these areas into the
following sections: Understanding the Propensity to Attack;
Observing Behaviour of Trusted Personnel; The Actor / In-
sider; Dissecting the Attack; and Assets Under Attack and their
Vulnerabilities.
A. Understanding the Propensity to Attack
To explain the elements of the framework and their rela-
tionships, we begin with the behavioural and psychological
aspects relating to the Actor; in many ways, these can be
seen as the antecedents or key initial factors to understanding
an individual’s propensity to attack. The topic of an insider’s
psychology has received substantial research and practitioner
emphasis over the last few years (e.g., [17, 18, 39]), after
being somewhat overlooked in early enterprise-security work.
Based on our research into these articles and the collected
case data, we identify eight elements that may be especially
2116
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Fig. 2. ‘Propensity to attack’ elements
useful in modelling and analysing this aspect of insider threats.
These are the Precipitating Event or catalyst, the individual’s
Personality Characteristics, Historical Behaviour, Psycholog-
ical State, Attitudes Towards Work, Skill Set, Opportunity and
lastly, Motivation to Attack. Below, we discuss these elements
in further detail, and then consider the relationships between
elements; this discursive approach is also adopted for the
remainder of this Section.
The Precipitating Event is the key event or catalyst that has
the potential to tip the insider over the edge into becoming
a threat to their employer. This term was initially seen in the
insider-threat literature in Moore et al. [40], and has also aptly
been called the ‘tipping point’ [33]. Examples of such events
include employee dismissal, disputes with employers (e.g.,
regarding IP rights), perceived injustices, negative company
acts (e.g., lay-offs), family problems (divorce, child custody
issues, health problems), coercion, new opportunities (e.g., job
offer from a competing company), or even lack of training
in the case of accidental attacks. Research in the ﬁeld of
Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour (CWB) [35, 41] was
crucial to our deﬁnition and understanding of these events, and
their general link to human behaviour and aggression at work.
A signiﬁcant point that arose from our cases and CWB
literature (e.g., [35]) is that a negative event need not have
happened, as perception or rumours of something bad can be
just as damaging. The case of the systems administrator that
began constructing a logic bomb [7, p. 257]) based on rumours
of lower bonuses is a perfect example. Moreover, being mind-
ful of only employees’ work-related activities might result in
missing other events that could be the catalyst for attacks.
Similarly, as accidental attacks become more detrimental to
the enterprise [42], there will be a growing need to understand
better how they come about, and the related tipping points.
Generally, however, this Precipitating Event element reﬂects
the need for better appreciation of the range of events that
could set an insider along the path to an attack.
Personality Characteristics, including psychological traits
and dispositions, capture the features of an Actor’s personality
based both on their innate self (thus, the static aspects)
and their life experiences (therefore, the more responsive
and dynamic aspects). General personality traits can include
their OCEAN (Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion,
Agreeableness, Neuroticism) [43], the Dark Triad (Machiavel-
lianism, Narcissism and Psychopathy) [44], and Sensation-
Seeking [41]. Other Characteristics may include: maturity,
aggressiveness, social-skill problems, superﬁciality, (lack of)
self-esteem and personal integrity [17, 45].
As they pertain to insider threat, Personality Characteristics
are central to how we as humans think and act, and therefore
have a strong inﬂuence on whether or not an individual
is likely to get involved in malicious activities or threat-
enhancing behaviour at work (be it intentional or uninten-
tional). Our cases highlighted the importance of this, especially
the impact that Personality Characteristics may have on future
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actions. We were able to identify Personality Characteristics
as being a factor in many of the cases, and validated the
associated relationship against behaviours using literature. Per-
sonality traits such as Machiavellianism, excitement-seeking,
and Narcissism were found to relate to insider threats and
antisocial behaviour [17,41,46]. Likewise, from an accidental-
threat perspective, some OCEAN (especially, agreeableness
and openness) traits can relate closely with an individual’s
susceptibility to scams [47].
It is important to understand, however, that although some
Personality Characteristics are worthy of note, they are not
sufﬁcient in isolation to identify a potential attacker rather, we
need to assess clusters of Personality Characteristics together
with catalysts (Precipitating Events) and even the individ-
ual’s environment. For example, an employee who is highly
Narcissistic, in some cases might be the perfect choice for
a particular role in an organisation; however, in combination
with a stressful event (e.g., being over-looked for a promotion)
or opportunity (e.g., being offered a new job elsewhere with
better beneﬁts), this may lead to a speciﬁc psychological
state which then results in an increased risk being posed
to the organisation. Aldrich Ames, for instance, reportedly
suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder which lead
him to “believe he was bulletproof” [48], a likely factor in
his espionage. As mentioned above, clusters of Personality
Characteristics might also be useful to consider. For example,
an individual who scores high on all three personality traits
that constitute the Dark Triad might, theoretically, pose a
greater threat than those who do not.
Historical Behaviour documents the kinds of activities the
Actor has engaged in during the past and, as with most
behaviour, is likely to be inﬂuenced by their Personality
Characteristics. There are, of course, an inﬁnite range of
behaviours, but from a malicious, insider-threat perspective,
examples of notable behaviours include: addictive practices
(e.g., gambling or alcohol abuse), previous rule violations
(e.g., harassment or company policy violations), criminal
history, or a history of serious mental problems. Of course,
when considered in isolation, this again is not alone indicative
of an individual becoming an insider threat. For unintentional
threats, behaviours discovered to be relevant were typically the
result of human error (e.g. carelessness or absent-mindedness)
[49].
Overall, many of the above are linked to the person’s
personality. A CMU-CERT case [7, p. 257] illustrates this
element’s importance, though, when a system administrator
with a history of electronic crimes used similar malicious
techniques to attack his employer, ﬁrst using blackmail and
then sabotage. This suggests that past actions have some
inﬂuence on future actions – a point further supported by CWB
literature [50]. There is the argument that if proper checks had
been conducted beforehand then appropriate measures could
have been taken. Yet, to actually conduct such checks may
be challenging given the mobility of today’s workforce, and
companies may not have the resources available to perform
extensive investigations. Either way, behaviour remains a sig-
niﬁcant factor in understanding (if not necessarily diagnosing)
insider attacks.
Psychological State represents the Actor’s psychological and
emotional state (e.g., happy, depressed, stressed or anxious).
This might be, in part, due to their psychological make-up
(e.g., some individuals have clinical depression), or as a result
of their environment (e.g., a stressful event, such as forced
job transfer, which leads to depression [38]), which therefore
explains the relationships with Personality Characteristics and
Precipitating Event respectively. If the environment causes the
state it might arise from an event outside the workplace, or
from within it. In the insider-threat literature, it is commonly
a disgruntled employee responsible for attacks; but disgruntle-
ment is only one of a set of states found to be a compelling
precursor in our case research. Others include stress, fear (e.g.,
of dismissal or group exclusion), a lack of appreciation, a
feeling of entitlement (to customer contact data for instance),
feeling opportunistic, or, from an accidental threat perspective,
carelessness, boredom or dissatisfaction.
Further insight was also attained from the research on CWB,
where several other Psychological States of concern can be
found which have (validated) relationships with counterpro-
ductive behaviours such as perceptions of organisational in-
justice and workplace inequalities, or revenge cognitions [35].
An interesting point here is that like the Precipitating Event,
the Actor’s state can be inﬂuenced by opportunities that happen
to present themselves. For example, in one case [7, p. 272] the
system administrator happened upon several unprotected ﬁles
on an FTP server, an opportunity he found too great to pass
up, as he later cracked the encryption passwords in the ﬁles,
thereby gaining unauthorised access to an extensive amount
of customer data. Although undocumented, it is plausible that
certain traits or experiences in his background (e.g., impulsive
behaviour) in conjunction with the Event provoked him to
seize the opportunity and act maliciously.
Motivation to Attack captures the reason that an Actor might
desire to attack the enterprise. The notion of attack motivation
is well understood in the threat-assessment ﬁeld and therefore,
in addition to case reﬂection, we drew heavily on existing
work [34] for our general categories. Namely, motivations can
be: ﬁnancial, political, for revenge, curiosity or fun, power,
competitive advantage, or peer recognition. Based on our
case ﬁndings, we posit that an Actor’s current Psychological
State would be a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on their Motivation to
Attack. For instance, a contractor’s disgruntlement because of
mistreatment might give rise to some desires for revenge; or,
fear of being excluded from the ofﬁce ‘in crowd’ or loyalty
to friends/family/country [25] may motivate an employee to
engage in an attack (not dissimilar to the situation with theft in
Greenberg and Barling [51]). This general State-to-Motivation
relationship was also apparent when reﬂecting on the related
CWB literature, insofar as it relates to anger, frustration and
various perceptions (e.g., of unfairness or injustice) [35].
Interestingly, Psychological State can also be coupled with
Attitude Towards Work in its inﬂuence on Motivation. For
example, if an employee was constantly overlooked for a
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promotion, therefore possibly feeling aggrieved (Psychological
State), he might feel that his strong commitment to his
employer (Attitude) might have been misplaced, and hence
become highly motivated to attack. This idea, albeit anecdotal
at this stage, ties in closely with existing work on the individ-
ual relationships, from State to Motivation [35] and Attitude to
Motivation [36]. For this Motivation element, we also consider
the possibility of accidental insider attacks. To describe these,
we maintain two overarching classiﬁcations of motivation,
one ‘deliberate’ (capturing the categories above) and one
‘accidental’ (to accommodate human factors, mistakes, etc.).
This ensures that our framework is inclusive enough to capture
all types of threats.
Skill-Set captures the Actor’s capability or the requisite
skills needed to conduct an attack [34]. Arguably it is reason-
able to make the link between the role that an Actor carries
out, within an enterprise, and the Skill-Set that they possess;
although there is certainly scope for a skill set outside of a job
role. This is highlighted by a CMU-CERT case [7, p. 253]:
a software developer at an organisation who was angry at
the lack of company bonuses inserted malicious code into the
enterprise’s premier product, an inter-network communication
interface. In this instance it was the employee’s software-
development background and associated development skill that
allowed him to initiate and carry out the attack.
Opportunity captures the Actor’s chance to initiate an attack
on the enterprise. The notion of the opportunity to attack
is well deﬁned within related literature relating to threat-
assessment and risk management. Clearly, in order for an
Actor to carry out a malicious attack on an organisation,
they will need an opportunity to initiate the attack [34]. For
example, CMU-CERT present the case [7, p. 266] of an
insider, employed by the police, to communicate information
about drivers’ licenses. The insider was then recruited by a
third-party to provide license information, and later progressed
to creating fraudulent licenses. The opportunity in this case
was the insider’s authorised access to the license database;
without this access, the attack could not have taken place.
The progression from Psychological State to Motivation to
Attack is one stage in particular where employers (via the
Human Resources (HR) department or security practitioners)
could step in and address potentially negative states (e.g.,
observed feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, or irresponsibility)
before the individual becomes motivated to attack. This could
mean HR meeting with the employee to discuss and correct
any misunderstandings in a more relaxed manner, offering
additional support if an employee is going through personal
problems, or from a more technical perspective, changing
policies, or implementing new security measures meant to
deter thoughts of attack.
B. Observing behaviour of trusted personnel
Two areas that are key to understanding and modelling
insider attacks are observations about an Actor’s Physical and
Cyber behaviour. Observed Physical Behaviour captures the
actual physical behaviour that may have been exhibited by an
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Fig. 3. Behaviour elements
Actor, for example in the ofﬁce, with colleagues or accessing
buildings and resources. Observed Cyber Behaviour places the
focus on the technologically-related behaviour that an Actor
may exhibit over the enterprise information infrastructure, such
as the usage of Internet, e-mail, and workstations.Both of the
observed sets of behaviour may be indicative of an attack
either currently being conducted, or soon to be conducted.
Moore et al. [40] propose similar aspects in their analysis
of insider threats, explicitly naming them behavioural and
technical precursors. Many of these can also be seen in work
by the FBI [27]. In our research, we are compiling (as far as
possible) a comprehensive list of behaviours that will be of
interest when trying to understand insider threats.
For the physical domain, examples of potentially concerning
behaviours include: assaulting or intimidating co-workers,
clients or business partners, expressing a negative attitude
towards the company, violating company policy, and poor job
performance. On the other hand, concerning cyber behaviour
includes: violating technology usage policies, attempts to gain
access to data of systems beyond their job’s responsibilities,
and deactivating security tools. In terms of relationships, all
these behaviours may be inﬂuenced by Personality Charac-
teristics and Historical Behaviour. In the ﬁrst case, the type
of person someone is can undoubtedly inﬂuence their actions,
while in the second case, although not inevitable, previous
behaviour does often reoccur, potentially because of the link
to personality.
It is important to remember that observing precursor be-
haviours in isolation may not necessarily be indicative of
an insider attack. Whilst some behaviours may clearly be
directly-related to an attack (e.g., breaking into a safe), other
behaviours may require a more holistic view of the inter-play
with related factors from our framework to establish whether
an attack is present.
C. The actor
In Section I we deﬁned the concept of an insider within
an organisation. The Actor element within our framework
is used to deﬁne a number of generic types of individual
that could be considered as part of an insider attack (using
the deﬁnition provided in Section I). The types of individual
we have identiﬁed are: employee, contractor or consultant,
client or customer, joint venture partner, vendor and external
attacker; most of these individuals represent positions held by
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Fig. 4. Actor elements
trusted personnel, with the exception of an external attacker.
The external attacker is included in this list because of the fact
that individuals that are external to an organisation may recruit
and collaborate with any of the trusted personnel to assist in
conducting an attack against the enterprise. This collaboration
could be voluntary (e.g. mutual desire for ﬁnancial gain),
coerced (e.g. blackmail) or unknowing (e.g. as a result of a
phishing or social-engineering attack).
We make the assumption that an Actor is innocent until
proven otherwise, and so there may or may not be a Motivation
for Attack. This list of types of individuals who can be
considered insiders is by no means novel, but it should serve
to stress the fact that employees are not a company’s only
concern. There have been several documented attacks (e.g.,
CMU-CERT [7, pp. 248, 269, 271]) originating from a variety
of trusted third parties, sometimes with much higher privileged
access than the average employee.
The State of Relationship and Enterprise Role are directly
related to the Actor. The ﬁrst identiﬁes the current state of
the relationship between the enterprise and the Actor, while
the second captures the role that the Actor may have in the
enterprise. There are four states of relationship which we
distinguish: current, former, serving notice and temporary.
Although people in any of these states may be dangerous
to an organisation, cases have shown that individuals in the
last three states may be especially risky. In several cases for
example, Actors serving notice, especially those that work with
sensitive information, are of signiﬁcant concern because they
may attempt to take it with them to boost their value to a
competing organisation. The types of Enterprise Role vary
considerably but knowledge of an Actor’s role is useful as
certain roles have been shown to tend towards speciﬁc attacks,
with set attack objectives in mind. According to Cappelli et
al. [7], for instance, scientists, engineers, programmers and
salespeople are typically the roles that steal IP, and usually for
the purposes of setting up their own business, carrying to a
new job, or giving to foreign organisations or governments.
D. Dissecting the attack
An Attack represents an activity that is conducted by an
Actor, either deliberately or accidentally, that will have a
negative impact on the enterprise. The Attack will typically
have a result associated with it, i.e. an Attack Objective. An
Attack Objective 
e.g., Sabotage 
company  
Attack Step 
e.g., Hack into  
company server 
Attack 
e.g., Plant and 
execute logic 
bomb 
Attack Step Goal 
e.g., Access 
restricted area 
Fig. 5. Attack elements
example of an Attack is a former IT administrator planting and
executing a logic bomb on his previous employer’s network;
while the objective, in this case, may be sabotage. There are a
large array of possible attacks, especially when considering the
disparate areas of sabotage, IP theft and fraud, and therefore
we will not seek to enumerate them in this article; these will,
however, be available at some point on our website [52].
Attack Objectives are much more constrained, and tend to
consist of: ﬁnancial gain, personal gain, competitive gain,
political gain and damage to the organisation. Attack Ob-
jectives, as one would expect, are usually closely tied with
the motivations behind the threat. For instance, desire for
revenge usually leads to an attack seeking personal gain or to
damage the company. In the case where an attack is accidental
or unintentional, we consider the Objective to be task or
activity that is the reason for the incident. Therefore, having
to complete a task at work under strict time constraints could
be the Objective that was the reason for an employee taking
a USB stick with sensitive data home, which was later lost
during their commute. By modelling accidental threats in this
way, we are able to gain further insight into the reasons linked
to attacks, and thus facilitate better understanding.
While Attacks aim to be generic, Attack Steps deﬁne, in
detail, the speciﬁc activities undertaken to conduct the attack.
As such, an Attack can be composed of several chained Steps.
To steal sensitive IP, an insider threat may: (i) determine which
of their colleagues has the credentials to access the desired
IP (reconnaissance); (ii) coerce those individuals - possibly
via ﬁnancial means, charm or physical threats - to assist
in the task; (iii) use the ill-gotten credentials to access the
IP; (iv) download the IP to portable media; and (v) delete
the related log ﬁles. These Attack Steps can also be thought
of in terms of the value gained from each step, namely, the
Attack Step Goal. Thus, for the steps above, we would have:
(i) gathering intelligence; (ii) recruiting accomplices; (iii)
accessing restricted data; (iv) exﬁltration of a volume of data;
and ﬁnally (v) covering tracks. We believe that these goals
can be particularly helpful when discussing the insider-threat
problem with top management, and effectively communicating
the attack, inclusive of what would be gained through each
step, without going into excessive technical detail.
Attacks Steps share some similarity with the pre-existing
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notion of Attack Trees [53], in that both methods can describe
how a particular target or asset might be attacked. The value
of our Attack Steps is that they allow for the clear sequencing
and ordering of actions. We envisage that this added value
with Steps is particularly useful when it comes to applying
our framework to understand and assess an insider attack.
The idea of Intrusion Kill Chains [54] has particular rele-
vance when considering our Attack Steps. These Kill Chains
provide a means of describing the different phases of an
intrusion and are modelled as a chain to emphasise the idea
that if there is a breakdown at any one stage then the entire
process is disrupted. Intrusion Kill Chains are designed to
model attacks, with the aim of highlighting patterns within
individual intrusions and how they may ﬁt into part of a
larger threat. It is easy to imagine how a similar aim could
be achieved using our Attack Steps; when enough attacks
have been collected and modelled then they could be used
to establish common Attack Steps. The concept of building
a library of Attack Steps is similar to the idea of Common
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classiﬁcation (CAPEC) [55].
Attacks are recorded there in a similar fashion to our Attack
Steps, and then CAPEC is used to identify opportunities for
increasing the ‘robustness and defendability’ of software.
Step 3. 
Delete/edit 
system log 
files Step 1b.  
Collect company 
secrets and IP 
Step 1a.  
Develop a 
relationship with 
a rival company Step 2. 
Copy IP and 
sensitive data 
Fig. 6. Attack Steps
Figure 6 shows an example sequence of Attack Steps within
an Attack, and highlights the strong sense of ordering within
the attack. All steps at the same level in an Attack Tree are
essentially in parallel, and so do not preserve any ordering.
Figure 6 highlights an idea of concurrency in our Attack Steps,
as the initial stage of the attack sees the Actor both developing
a relationship with a rival company while at the same time
gathering company secrets and IP in tandem. This example
of Attack Steps can than be followed through, sequentially, to
the IP being copied and ﬁnally the Actor editing and deleting
log ﬁles in order to cover up the evidence of their attack.
E. Assets under attack and their vulnerabilities
The last two classes of element are Assets, items of value to
the enterprise and of interest to the threat (e.g., company data,
hardware, and personnel), and Vulnerabilities, weaknesses in
assets or controls protecting them (e.g., weak passwords on ad-
ministrative accounts, unpatched Web servers, and inadequate
building security).
These are well-understood and frequently modelled aspects,
and therefore are not covered in any detail here; Jones and
Ashenden [34] offer further insight. In the framework, we
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Fig. 7. ‘Assets and vulnerability’ elements
link these elements to Attack Steps instead of to the Attack,
in order to allow a more detailed deﬁnition of the assets and
vulnerabilities associated with each attack step. The advantage
for a security practitioner with this conﬁguration is the ability
to see exactly what assets may be or have been targeted by
each step of an attack, and the respective vulnerabilities that
could be or were exploited. With the theft of IP example
above, assets targeted were personnel, data, access credentials
and log ﬁles, while vulnerabilities included a lack of security-
awareness training and employee support, failure to monitor
or block portable-media downloads, and inadequate protection
of sensitive ﬁles. If conducting an investigation into a line of
potential insider attacks after the fact, the way we deﬁne the
attack steps could also allow an analyst to spot patterns, for
example, certain assets usually being targeted or vulnerabilities
exploited en route to more comprehensive attacks.
The various elements and relationships described in this
section allows us to bring together precipitating events, in-
dividual’s personality traits (and predispositions), behaviours
(both historic and current), enterprise states and roles, attacks
(and their detailed steps and goals) and targeted assets. With
this framework, we can begin to characterise insider attack as
we illustrate farther below.
IV. USING THE FRAMEWORK TO CAPTURE ATTACKS
To demonstrate the framework’s use in assessing attacks, we
apply it to three new cases. The ﬁrst is based on a CMU-CERT
case [56, p. 20] involving fraud, the second is based on a case
of accidental leakage [57], and the third case is a scenario
that we have devised. The aim in the last case is illustrate the
framework’s ability to handle concerns and threats resulting
from human-factor-related issues associated with both poor
systems setup and human error.
A. Case 1 - Tax ofﬁce manager engaged in fraud
A tax ofﬁce employed the insider as a manager. The insider
had detailed knowledge of the organisation’s systems and
helped design the organisation’s newly implemented com-
puter system. The insider convinced management that her
department’s activities should be processed outside of this
new system. All records for the insider’s department were
maintained manually, on paper, and were easily manipulated.
Over 18 years, she issued more than 200 fraudulent checks,
totalling millions of dollars. The insider had at least nine
accomplices, insiders and outsiders, with unspeciﬁed roles in
the scheme. The incident was detected when a bank teller
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Fig. 8. Applying the framework to Case 1
reported a suspicious check for more than $400,000. The
insider was arrested, convicted, and ordered to pay $48 million
in restitution, $12 million in federal taxes, and $3.2 million
in state taxes. One of the insider’s motivations was that she
enjoyed acting as a benefactor, giving co-workers money
for things like private school tuition, funerals, and clothing;
this was in addition to her own lavish lifestyle with luxury
cars and designer clothing. The insider avoided suspicion by
telling her co-workers that she had received a substantial
family inheritance. The insider apparently endured a traumatic
childhood, leading her to abuse drugs and alcohol and develop
a substantial gambling habit.
Figure 8 shows this case mapped against the framework;
we use ‘No data’ where we have no further information on
an element. The framework allows a security practitioner or
researcher to clearly visualise the situation surrounding the
insider and the attack conducted. Here, for instance, we see
the catalyst for the attack (implementation of a new system),
and the insider’s Psychological State as inﬂuenced by the
catalyst and their Personality Characteristics. We also are
able to model the person’s historical actions relating to drugs,
alcohol and gambling, and the affect that had on their currently
observed behaviour. Most importantly, the framework links
three key elements relating to the actor that ultimately led
her to the attack, i.e., her ﬁnancial needs, her management
and inter-personal skills (these allowed her to convince upper
management that her department should be treated differently)
and the opportunity present, in use of easily manipulated
manual records.
This case shows one example of how our framework can
be used to map a case of malicious insider threat, and more
speciﬁcally, Data Fraud. The framework can also be applied
to other malicious cases including IT Sabotage and IP Theft.
For instance, if we consider a case of IT Sabotage where an
employee (Actor) has deleted critical system ﬁles shortly after
being made redundant, this would map well to our framework.
This could be seen in the precipitating event (the employee
being made redundant), the relationship status (the employee
is serving notice) and possibly their emotional state (angry,
dissatisfaction or anxiety). In addition to this, there may or
may not be changes to the employee’s physical behaviour. One
might imagine, for example, that as he is angry or anxious,
that he lashes out or snaps at co-workers. From the technical
perspective, there is also a reasonable chance that there was
a change to their cyber behaviour. In the case of deleting
essential system ﬁles then it might well be the case that this
was an area of the system that was not normally used by the
employee. This discussion just covers a few of the ways in
which general malicious attacks can be modelled.
B. Case 2 - Booking clerk accidentally leaking sensitive data
A booking clerk at a prison became an ‘accidental insider’
by unintentionally pasting the sensitive details of over 1000
inmates into an email, in response to a visitation booking
request. The insider was new to the role and did not have a
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Fig. 9. Applying the framework to Case 2
sufﬁcient level of experience, training or supervision. Prisoner
data is stored on a network database, called Quantum; this is
a secure network system that meets the UK Government’s IT
standards, and to which access is highly controlled. There is
a separate biometrics system, which is not networked, that
is used to process and book visits to the prison. The two
systems are entirely separate and the existing process to update
the biometrics system was to perform a ‘proﬁle dump’ of
inmate details, essentially copying and pasting a ﬁle, via the
Windows Explorer, to an unencrypted removable disk. The
clerk accidentally pasted this sensitive personal data into an
email and sent it to the family of an inmate, who had requested
a visit. This was not the ﬁrst time that this had happened;
in fact, it is reported that the same employee had made the
same mistake twice before. The Ministry of Justice was ﬁned
£140,000 by the Information Commissioner’s Ofﬁce as a result
of the breach.
In Figure 9, we show how this case of an unintentional
attack can be modelled; we use ‘Not Applicable’ for elements
that typically do not apply in accidental cases. The ﬁrst point
of note is that several of the elements in the framework are
unpopulated, and this can to some extent be expected. The
reason behind this is that as it is an accidental threat, the
‘attack’ is likely to be very sudden (in this case, a momentary
lapse in concentration or judgement) and as such, there are
probably behaviours to be concerned about (physical or cyber)
or notable characteristics that are immediately relevant. More-
over, there is arguably no Attack Objective or Attack Step Goal
as these assume malicious intent. On the other hand, accidental
cases can often offer some useful information – this case
for instance, highlights the carelessnesses of the individual
in terms of their current state and historical behaviour and
actions. For security practitioners using this framework, the
catalyst is also of interest, as this hints to the real problem at
hand.
The above case serves to illustrate the usefulness of the
framework, in that this is an incident of data loss that had
happened on two previous occasions, in very similar cir-
cumstances and with the same employee involved. Using the
framework to reﬂect on the two previous incidents might well
have highlighted the employee’s lack of training or need for
supervision, or it might have served to highlight ﬂaws in the
day-to-day procedures when transferring sensitive data.
The framework is capable of mapping a number of other
accidental-insider scenarios: for example, if we think of the
fairly common situation of a USB drive being lost (or for-
gotten) in a public place. There might be no changes to the
employee’s physical behaviour, and they may not have any
prior history of data loss, but there are still factors that our
framework would be able to capture. In this case it could be
that there were external stresses in the employee’s personal
life that have had an impact on their psychological state, this
in turn could have caused them to forget to pick up all of their
belongings after a long train journey. These are some of the
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Fig. 10. Applying the framework to Case 3
ways in which we could look to model and further understand
accidental insider attacks.
C. Case 3 - Inappropriate browsing resulting in attack
The third ‘attack’ that we cover is a case that we have
created based on a combination of cases assessed. The attack
that we are modelling is an accidental-insider case, which
also contains elements of suspicious behaviour. This serves
to highlight that our framework is capable of mapping attacks
that span several categories.
As temporary cover for an administrator assistant role,
a medium-sized logistics company hired a highly qualiﬁed
graduate. During his interview, the HR manager was concerned
about his interest in the role, but because his father was a
friend of the director, her concerns were overruled. Initially
the insider was punctual to work and appeared keen on the
job. From week three, however, this changed. Co-workers
observed a decline in the quality of his work, an increasing
number of late arrivals, and a general apathy to the job
and its responsibilities. His immediate supervisor noticed his
carelessness and the low-quality work, but as only two weeks
remained on his contract, he largely ignored them. After lunch
one day, the insider was bored and instead of working, browsed
to an illegal ﬁlm streaming website; he did this a few times
a week and avoided the company’s block on the sites by
disabling his workstation’s security software. On this occasion,
he was the victim of a ‘drive-by download’ which, unbeknown
to him, infected his workstation with a virus. The virus then
quickly spread to the enterprise network and from there to
other workstations, eventually causing a full shutdown of the
network and a three-day pause in logistical operations. An
estimated $600,000 in damage and lost proﬁt was caused by
this inadvertent attack on company systems. An investigation
into the event found that the insider had broken IT policies
in his previous employment, and he was perceived to have a
generally careless attitude. The case is modelled in Figure 10.
As mentioned in the section above, modelling accidental
‘attack’ incidents is difﬁcult for many reasons, most notably
the potentially sudden nature of the attack and likely lack
of precursors, although there will be repeat (and so to some
extent predictable) offenders. The case here is one where the
insider has displayed a number of concerning indicators, such
as tardiness, apathy towards roles, and accessing illegal sites,
that should have been picked up on by his employer. Failure
to recognise and deal with these aspects, coupled with his
possession of the right skill-set and the opportunity, led to the
unfortunate accidental attack on the enterprise and substantial
loss. The beneﬁt of the framework to this case would be
identifying the key elements along the attack path and the
behaviours that should have concerned security practitioners
and HR. Assuming we had an attack-pattern database to
compare against, these behaviours might have highlighted the
increased possibility of an attack. Of course, there is also the
fact that some of these aspects by themselves should have
caused concern, as they are a direct breach of company policy.
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V. DISCUSSION
Thus far, we have presented a framework for characterising
insider attacks, and demonstrated how real-world cases can
be mapped on to it to facilitate deeper understanding. This
is particularly through the linking of various critical elements
that play a part in an insider attack. Whilst we believe that
this framework provides a rich foundation for the analysis of
insider threats, we also acknowledge that there are many other
proposed frameworks and models relating to this threat. In this
section, we reﬂect on the most relevant contributions from
the literature, and critically compare our framework against
these. A point to note here is that we do not cover proposals
dedicated exclusively towards the detection of insider threats,
as this is not our aim here and is therefore out of the scope
of this paper. After reﬂecting on our work as compared to
other’s proposals, we consider the challenges to the use of the
framework within organisations today and in the future.
A. Reﬂection against related works
The CERT project conducted by CMU [7] is without
question one of the most comprehensive contributions to the
ﬁeld. As part of their research, CERT have proposed a series
of MERIT (Management and Education of the Risk of Insider
Threat) models using System Dynamics, to describe different
types of attack (IT sabotage, IP theft, data fraud). As part
of our discussion, we shall focus on the approach they have
adopted, and consider how this very relevant work compares
against our method and framework.
System Dynamics provide a mechanism for simulating com-
plex environments, through the use of positive or negatively-
reinforced causal loops. For instance, as an employee becomes
disgruntled, the more likely that they will under-perform,
which in turn will result in more disciplinary action, that
will mean that the employee becomes more disgruntled. By
their very nature as a tool for modelling these intricate
environments, these conceptualisations can quickly become
quite difﬁcult to understand as the model becomes overly-
large [58]. In addition, since System Dynamics models tend
to describe a cyclic process, there is no immediately obvious
starting point for mapping knowledge to a model, which could
even act as an initial challenge for practitioners.
Compared to the CERT models, our framework was de-
liberately designed to strike a balance between ease of use
and extensive coverage of the fundamental components of
the problem. We also wanted to preserve the natural chain
of events that typically surround insider attacks, in that, the
catalyst triggers the individual to, at some point in the future,
conduct an attack against the organisation. Again, our main
aim is to facilitate an improved understanding between the
various components of the insider-threat problem by clearly
identifying the relationship that exists between the different
attributes. In doing this, we aim to provide a pragmatic tool
that could potentially be adopted by any organisation, regard-
less of their technical capability. As will be discussed later, as
part of our future work we will be working alongside security
practitioners to obtain feedback on the framework, and on
its perceived utility and coverage. Whilst the MERIT models
certainly provide a comprehensive view, there exist attributes
that may well be difﬁcult for an organisation to know, even
during a post-mortem examination of the attack: for instance,
detailed access paths unknown to the organisation.
What makes System Dynamics particularly powerful as a
modelling tool is its ability to easily translate a model into a
mathematical simulation, and there exist software tools such as
Vensim (http://vensim.com) to achieve this. This also
poses another signiﬁcant challenge, however, namely how to
accurately quantify attributes, and how to quantify the impact
that one attribute may have on another. Whilst other modelling
tasks may have well-quantiﬁable attributes, this is clearly not
the case with insider-threat assessment, since most of the
problem is centred around the mind-set of the individual. In
our framework, we purposely do not aim to quantify attributes,
as this is not the intended use of it at this stage.
Another notable difference in the approach taken in our
work compared to that of the MERIT models is that each
MERIT model is speciﬁcally designed for particular form of
attack. In contrast, our framework is designed to characterise
any form of insider-based attack. A key beneﬁt therefore, is
that our framework allows a variety of attacks to be assessed
using the same basis, and moreover, it is broad enough to
cope with attacks that merge different types of attack. MERIT
models also seem to concentrate on the problem from the
viewpoint of the organisation. Here, we have taken an insider-
centric approach to developing our framework since the insider
is going to be at the very core of any insider-threat incident.
Each model contains attributes that do not feature in the other;
for example, CERT address the organisation’s trust of the
insider, whereas we address attributes such as the insider’s
attitude towards work. Due to the differences in how our
framework is positioned, it is indeed quite possible that the
models could complement each other.
In other works, Pﬂeeger et al. [39] present a framework
for describing insider threats and their actions, which is based
upon four key attributes: the organisation, the environment, the
system and the individual. The framework is designed to allow
an analyst to question how attributes interact, for example, ‘Do
the actions of the individual violate de jure or de facto policy?’,
or ‘W hat was the intent of the action?’. By formulating
answers to such questions, this can be used to classify different
threats by how they relate to the deﬁned attributes. This
methodology provides a useful platform on which to base
an initial investigation. However, as the authors acknowledge,
their framework lacks the full scope of detail, such as attributes
that focus on the insider’s perspective, and events that lead up
to the attack. Instead, their model provides a much higher-level
overview of the problem space. In much the same fashion, our
framework could be considered at an overview level to assess
the catalyst (environment), the actor (individual), the attack
(system), and the organisation. Our framework then allows
one to delve much deeper into formulating understanding
surrounding each of these core components, by deﬁning the
individual attributes that make up each component.
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Sarkar [30] discusses the factors that contribute towards
the creation of an insider threat, and identiﬁes capability,
motivation and opportunity as the three key attributes that
if an insider threat possesses then they have a high poten-
tial to attack. These three attributes are also present in our
framework, and in addition, we illustrate how an insider may
come to possess each of these through the linked relationship
with other elements. For instance, if it is known that the
individual is highly neurotic (a personality characteristic), are
they more likely to react badly to the news of a demotion,
and therefore be motivated to attack? Since our framework
shows the link between elements, establishing whether such
relationships exist may become much clearer.
B. Challenges for the framework
We have designed the framework to facilitate the under-
standing and consideration of the factors associated with an
insider threat and the execution of an attack. By characterising
previously executed or publicly documented attacks with our
framework, one could begin to assess the prevalence of spe-
ciﬁc elements (e.g., Personality Characteristics, Psychological
States and Attack details) and their values (e.g., Social Skill
Problems, Disgruntlement or Stress), towards identifying pat-
terns of attack.
There are, however, a few challenges to the use of the
framework now and in the future. One of these difﬁculties
is in characterising aspects within insider threats, especially
when trying to understand the mind-set of the individual
that attacks. For instance, their intent can be based on both
static and dynamic personality traits. Static traits such as
the traditional OCEAN proﬁles [43] can be measured by
using established psychological surveys that are quite often
used by HR staff. Unfortunately, the reality is that it is
difﬁcult to deﬁnitively know whether information provided
by surveys is truly accurate, particularly if the subject is
already non-compliant. Dynamic traits are even more difﬁcult
to identify, and mostly can only be inferred by qualiﬁed staff
(e.g., personnel in HR with an appropriate psychology or
psychoanalysis background) from the actions of the individual;
not all companies will have such specialist staff at hand.
Often there is the possibility of relying on the co-operation of
other individuals within the organisation to report suspicious
behaviour observed in the workplace, or outside of it. The
problem here, however, is that this may be highly subjective
or pure conjecture. With all of these aspects in mind, in reality,
it is extremely difﬁcult to effectively collect useful data, and
in many cases, this even applies after an attack.
As an exercise in understanding how much data – especially
on the precursors to an attack – is currently captured in
reported cases, we reﬂected on the 179 cases we gathered
throughout our study. From our analysis, we found that there
were some parts of the framework that were well-documented
in all cases, but others that were mostly unknown. For instance,
Attack and Organisation Characteristics, as well as Actor
Roles, Types and Relationship States are typically well-known
elements; these were present in over 90% of the cases. To some
extent, this is unsurprising, given that it is easily observable
data: i.e., the attack is typically now known and the perpetrator
has been identiﬁed. In the cases where this information was
unknown, the attacks featured unknown attackers or accidents
that were unattributable, including loss, theft or sabotage.
On the other hand, elements where data was sparse included
Personality Characteristics (present in only 32% of cases),
Historical Behaviour (11% of cases), Attitude Towards Work
(31% of cases), and Observed Cyber (8%) and Physical (37%)
Behaviours. The ﬁrst point that one will note is that a number
of these elements are closely associated with the insider’s
mind-set. Our ﬁndings here, therefore, reiterate the difﬁculty
in gathering this psychological information on insider threats;
in many of the cases, we found that much more emphasis
was placed on the attack itself, rather than on gathering data
regarding indicators or precursors in order to learn from it.
An encouraging ﬁnding with regards to the framework itself
was that elements such as Precipitating Event, Psychological
State and Motivation to Attack were either very often stated
or easily inferrable from cases (present in 87%, 78% and
90% of cases respectively). This gives some hope in terms of
precursors to attack that are currently captured, and therefore
can be described and modelled, and later used for pattern
identiﬁcation. More generally, this mapping of the full set of
case data has also been useful for the framework as it has
validated its ability to capture and describe a large set of data.
Although it is useful to have detailed information on em-
ployees to better engage and understand the insider threat, the
gathering of such information also raises issues about ethical
and legal usage of information. As stated in the UK Data
Protection Act, personal data can only be used for the speciﬁed
purposes that it was collected for. Therefore, an organisation
would need to declare the introduction of employee monitoring
to the individuals within the organisation, if they choose to
use information for this purpose. Employees may well show
resentment against the idea of monitoring, feeling that it
invades their privacy, or induces a lack of trust between the
organisation and them. Kiser et al. [59] and Greitzer et al.
[60] are two insightful articles that explore the ethical issues
with monitoring and its broader impact in the enterprise. If
companies do decide to engage in more comprehensive moni-
toring, it would be essential that they consider the impacts and
possibly even run educational campaigns to assure employees
that those who act within the acceptable behaviour for their
job role should not be alarmed or concerned.
As a ﬁnal discussion point regarding the future development
of the framework, we address the issue of quantifying actions
and their impact. Foundational work in risk management
suggests that if an individual has motive, capability and
opportunity, then they are likely to conduct an attack. However,
a crucial question here is, what constitutes as ‘enough’ motive,
or ‘enough’ capability? Likewise, somebody may well exhibit
all these, and yet still choose not to attack. Much previous
literature also discusses the concept that if an individual is
disgruntled then they may choose to act out. Again though, it
is difﬁcult to know just how disgruntled an individual needs
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to become in order for them to pose a threat. Within our
framework, we do not aim to associate a particular value
with an element, such as high stress or medium-to-high
disgruntlement. Instead, we focus on deﬁning and capturing
the relationships between elements, for instance, how their
psychological state will impact their motivation to attack. The
framework could then be used further to assess past attacks
for how often individuals have exhibited a particular set of
attributes and what the outcome of this was (e.g., how the
attack was initiated, or the ﬂow of the attack). Such analysis,
once mature and supported by identiﬁed attack patterns, may
then allow one to infer the risk associated with observing a se-
ries of states within the framework. For example, if somebody
has previous history of disruption, their psychological state is
disgruntled, and they are about to be made redundant, then the
organisation may choose to take appropriate measures.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Insiders who constitute a threat can have a signiﬁcant
impact on the systems, processes and data of an organisation,
and ultimately, cause irreparable damage to its activities and
reputation. To tackle this problem properly, enterprises need
to have a good understanding of the threat that they face, and
the various aspects that are likely to be involved. In this paper,
we aim to facilitate a better understanding of the threat at
hand, through the presentation of a unifying framework to
fully characterise insider attacks. The framework has been
developed by a successful application of grounded theory to
a comprehensive set of cases and a substantial amount of
relevant literature, and has been further evaluated and reﬁned
using a second independent set of cases (e.g., [23]). As such,
we have some conﬁdence that our framework is able to capture
and identify a large proportion of the key elements that make
up the insider-threat problem, from signiﬁcant events and
indicators (e.g. behavioural and technical elements), to the
human factors that are behind (even unintentional) attacks.
We envisage that a principal use of the framework would
be to analyse past attacks and allow the identiﬁcation of
patterns that may exist between them. For instance, a security
practitioner who has documented insider-attack cases for their
enterprise can map these cases using the framework to look for
patterns across the set. In addition to identifying any patterns
(e.g., common attack routes), they may be able to highlight
areas where further information might be desirable (that is,
gathering more data to ﬁll in elements) in order to facilitate
more complete mapping, again leading to better understanding.
The problem of limited data is clearly a challenge to overcome
within research on insider-threat, as has been discussed in
Section V. We actually posit that the framework can be used
as a guide for collecting and organising case data in the short
term, and then once sufﬁcient data has been gathered, or could
apply it to spot patterns across the case set.
Looking towards the future, there are several avenues being
explored to advance the research presented in this paper.
The ﬁrst is on the use of the framework itself. That is, the
framework that we have developed has been created with
enterprises, security practitioners and researchers in mind.
In the future, therefore, we aim to conduct several formal
and informal feedback exercises with security practitioners
and researchers, in order to gain insight into the utility they
perceive for the framework and, especially, how easy it would
be for a typical practitioner to describe and model their own
cases. Another area of interest to us is the use of the framework
as a basis for an insider-threat detection approach. Although
there are several challenges in terms of the direct application
of the framework, as highlighted in our Discussion, there is
arguably scope for enhancing detection via the attack patterns.
That is, if an on-going case matches with a known attack
pattern in the framework, this could highlight the need for
investigation, or at least additional monitoring.
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